### UQ

#### Transportation bill will pass – our Everett evidence says there is a “bipartisan spring” of support – the House and Senate are “singing each other’s praises” and committed to an agreement

#### Will pass --- grand bargain coming

Everett 3/18 (Burgess, “WRDA draft out - Obama makes Labor pick; Transportation next? - Blumenauer confident in Obama's transpo acumen - GOP leadership still eyes infrastructure-drilling link”, <http://www.politico.com/morningtransportation/0313/morningtransportation10241.html>, CMR)

BLUMENAUER: OBAMA ‘COMMITTED’ TO TRANSPO INVESTMENT: The Oregon congressman continues to be heartened by the president’s infrastructure leadership as Barack Obama tries to piece together a balanced bargain. “The president has talked about it repeatedly and I think he’s committed to it. And it’s important it be on the table, because if we’re going to have a bigger wrap around mini bargain — let alone a grand bargain — it ought to be including infrastructure investment,” Rep. Earl Blumenauer told MT. Blumenauer said Rep. Peter DeFazio’s “double indexation” idea has “real merit” — now the Oregon duo is waiting to hear back from the president as he studies the proposal.

#### Bipartisan support and lobbies

Sink 3/29 (Justin, “Obama calls on Congress to approve $21B infrastructure bill”, <http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/291007-obama-calls-on-congress-to-approve-21b-infrastructure-bill>, CMR)

President Obama on Friday called for Congress to approve a $21 billion package aimed at building public-private partnerships to improve the nation's crumbling infrastructure.¶ “Let's get this done. Let's rebuild this country we love. Let's make sure we're staying on the cutting edge,” Obama told a boisterous crowd on a platform overlooking the Port of Miami.¶ ¶ The platform provided a view of a $2 billion tunnel project intended to improve congestion and allow for quicker trade. Obama said the project, funded by both public and private dollars, was a template for the rest of the nation.¶ “We can do this not just here in Miami Dade, but we can do this all across the country,” Obama said, calling for a “partnership to rebuild America.”¶ Obama suggested creating an infrastructure bank that could help seed major projects, and White House officials say they want Congress to allocate $10 billion for the program.¶ The president also unveiled a $4 billion investment program in support of the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA). The program, expanded in last year’s transportation bill, is intended to leverage private and nonfederal funding for projects of regional or national significance through loans, loan guarantees and lines of credit.¶ “Instead of picking projects based on pork barrel politics, we'll pick them based on how good they are for the economy,” Obama said.¶ Obama additionally called for a set of $7 billion in tax incentives meant to support state and municipal bonds for projects. Among them is a measure that would do away with penalties, sometimes totaling up to 35 percent, on foreign investment in U.S. real estate and infrastructure projects.¶ The president suggested there was a bipartisan consensus for his proposals, noting the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the nation's largest labor organization both back infrastructure spending.

### Intrinsicness

#### Politics tests a key opportunity cost

Steve Saideman, Associate Professor, Political Science, McGill University, “Key Constraint of Policy Relevance,” 7—25—11, http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2011/07/key-constraint-on-policy-relevance.html, accessed 10-2-11.

Dan Drezner has a great post today about how the foreign policy smart set (his phrase) gets so frustrated by domestic politics that they tend to recommend domestic political changes that are never going to happen. I would go one step further and suggest that one of the key problems for scholars who want to be relevant for policy debates is that we tend to make recommendations that are "incentive incompatible." I love that phrase. What is best for policy may not be what is best for politics, and so we may think we have a good idea about what to recommend but get frustrated when our ideas do not get that far. Lots of folks talking about early warning about genocide, intervention into civil wars and the like blame "political will." That countries lack, for whatever reason, the compulsion to act. Well, that is another way of saying that domestic politics matters, but we don't want to think about it. Dan's piece contains an implication which is often false--that IR folks have little grasp of domestic politics. Many IR folks do tend to ignore or simplify the domestic side too much, but there is plenty of scholarship on the domestic determinants of foreign policy/grand strategy/war/trade/etc. Plenty of folks look at how domestic institutions and dynamics can cause countries to engage in sub-optimal foreign policies (hence the tradeoff implied in my second book--For Kin or Country). The challenge, then, is to figure out what would be a cool policy and how that cool policy could resonate with those who are relevant domestically. That is not easy, but it is what is necessary. To be policy relevant requires both parts--articulating a policy alternative that would improve things and some thought about how the alternative could be politically appealing. Otherwise, we can just dream about the right policy and gnash our teeth when it never happens.

### Link

#### Linking drilling to current transportation discussions will fracture bipartisan consensus

Everett & Snider 3/27 (Burgess and Adam, <http://www.politico.com/morningtransportation/0313/morningtransportation10307.html>, CMR)

Beyond the CBO scores: Taking the idea on could risk some of the bipartisan cred recently built between Shuster and EPW Chairwoman Barbara Boxer. Rep. Peter DeFazio, a key Democratic transportation voice, said the idea “certainly wouldn't be helpful with a lot of people on my side of the aisle. And it wouldn't be helpful with the White House.” And to ranking Dem Nick Rahall, it’s about the numbers. He said energy can be “in the mix” of revenue options but that it’s unrealistic to think oil and gas production can provide commuters a free lunch. “It’s not the panacea for all of our problems ... we can’t drill our way out of the infrastructure deficit,” he told Burgess, who has the story here with an Adam assist: http://politi.co/108hpVH

**No risk of a link turn – congressional environment ensures polarization**

Brian **Scheid 3/26** “Hardline drilling rhetoric hinders partisan support for US E&P: congressman”, Washington Platts, http://www.readability.com/read?url=https%3A//www.google.com/url%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%26esrc%3Ds%26source%3Dnewssearch%26cd%3D22%26cad%3Drja%26ved%3D0CC4QqQIoADABOBQ%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.platts.com%252FRSSFeedDetailedNews%252FRSSFeed%252FOil%252F21877210%26ei%3DuV1TUd6KEaqBygGCyYGgCg%26usg%3DAFQjCNGXvCCJ5wavmVf9NRt4gySxSf88jg%26sig2%3D4qGfBHb5z0jUek9aIxRUtA%26bvm%3Dbv.44342787%2Cd.aWc

Cramer, a member of the House Natural Resources Committee who has introduced a bill, HR 767, that would open a more than seven-year pilot program to streamline the Bureau of Land Management's permitting process for federal land projects in the Dakotas, **said there is a stark division between Republicans and Democrats over permitting** timelines.¶ "I sometimes sit in the committee and think some people want to make it 10 [days] and some want to make it 3,000," he said.¶ **Those party line differences are becoming the norm** **in the ongoing energy debate and are readily apparent** during congressional hearings on fossil fuel and renewable issues, where witnesses are typically only "there to embarrass Barack Obama on our side and [with] witnesses on the other side that support only far left green organizations that think jet planes can fly on solar panels."¶ "**The environment around Congress is such that it seems to almost enhance a greater polarization** than I think is really instinctive in all of us," he said. "Maybe I'm naive and I'm a freshman and so I still have this idea that somehow we can find a way to discuss these things more rationally."

#### Democrats oppose new drilling.

Pew Research Center, 6-14-2010, Public Remains of Two Minds on Energy Policy, p. http://www.people-press.org/2010/06/14/public-remains-of-two-minds-on-energy-policy/, accessed 9-1-2012

By contrast, pluralities of Democrats (41%) and independents (36%) support continuing existing drilling but banning new projects. Democrats (33%) are more likely than independents (19%) or Republicans (11%) to favor a total ban on new offshore oil and gas drilling.

### Treasury

#### Their mechanism still links--now highly politicized

Thomas McGarity, Professor, Law, University of Texas, "Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age," DUKE LAW JOURNAL v. 61, 5--12, LN.

In this Article, I raise the possibility that the nation has entered a period in which the population is so deeply divided about the proper role of government, regulated industries are so willing to spend millions of dollars to vindicate their interests, and political discourse is so unrestrained that an even more expansive model of implementation may be warranted, at least in the context of high-stakes rulemaking initiatives. n23 First, the implementation game has spread to arenas that are far less structured and far more political than the agency hearing rooms and appellate courtrooms of the past. Second, the roster of players has expanded beyond agency and OIRA staffs, advocates for the regulated industry and beneficiary groups, and congressional aides to include individuals and organizations with broad policy agendas, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, think tanks, grassroots organizations, media pundits, and Internet bloggers. Third, because many parties play the implementation game in multiple arenas, the game has become far more strategic and the range of allowable tactics has widened rather dramatically. Finally, in this deeply divided political economy, the players in the implementation game no longer make a pretense of separation between the domains of politics and administrative law, and they are far less restrained in the rhetoric they employ to influence agency policymaking. n24 In this new milieu, "winning" can mean more than compelling unreasonable delays in agency action, invoking APA procedures to impede the policymaking process, or persuading the agency to accept a particular position on the relevant law and facts. Winning can consist of extracting promises from nominees during the confirmation process, preventing the confirmation of disfavored nominees, or preventing the confirmation of any agency leaders until the administration has agreed to change the agency's decisionmaking structure. Winning can also mean incapacitating the agency by reducing its annual appropriation, repealing the agency's organic act, or whittling away its regulatory authority through rifle-shot riders attached to must-pass legislation. n25 The players are less reluctant to attack agencies and the statutes those agencies administer head on. The players launch their attacks much earlier in the evolution of regulatory programs, and they feel free to go beyond attacks on the agencies as institutions to launch ad hominem attacks on agency decisionmakers. In short, I raise the possibility that, for some high-stakes rulemaking initiatives in some areas of regulation, implementation is not so much "politics by other means" as it is "politics as usual." And because politics is so very different from the deliberative, lawyer-dominated domain of traditional administrative law, the word "law" may no longer be an accurate descriptor. Former U.S. [\*1681] Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt referred in 2010 to federal regulation as a "kind of a blood sport" in which the regulated industries attempt "to make the particular agency" promulgating an unwelcome regulation "look stupid or inept or venal." n27 If the implementation of regulatory statutes has become a blood sport in important contexts, and if the goal of administrative law extends beyond ensuring procedural regularity to a concern about the effective implementation of legislation, then it would behoove administrative-law scholars to pay attention to the larger setting in which informal rulemaking now takes place and to begin thinking about the implications of these developments for the field.

### Winners Win

#### Not true for Obama on energy policy

Eisler 12 (Matthew N. Eisler, Research Fellow at the Center for Contemporary History and Policy at the Chemical Heritage Foundation, “Science, Silver Buckshot, and ‘All of The Above’” Science Progress, April 2, <http://scienceprogress.org/2012/04/science-silver-buckshot-and-%E2%80%9Call-of-the-above%E2%80%9D/>, CR)

Conservatives take President Obama’s rhetoric at face value. Progressives see the president as disingenuous. No doubt White House planners regard delaying the trans-border section of the Keystone XL pipeline and approving the Gulf of Mexico portion as a stroke of savvy realpolitik, but one has to wonder whether Democratic-leaning voters really are as gullible as this scheme implies. And as for the president’s claims that gasoline prices are determined by forces beyond the government’s control (speculation and unrest in the Middle East), it is probably not beyond the capacity of even the mildly educated to understand that the administration has shown little appetite to reregulate Wall Street and has done its part to inflate the fear premium through confrontational policies in the Persian Gulf. Committed both to alternative energy (but not in a rational, comprehensive way) and cheap fossil fuels (but not in ways benefiting American motorists in an election year), President Obama has accrued no political capital from his energy policy from either the left or the right by the end of his first term. The president long ago lost the legislative capacity for bold action in practically every field, including energy, but because the GOP’s slate of presidential candidates is so extraordinarily weak in 2012, he may not need it to get re-elected. At least, that is the conventional wisdom in Democratic circles. Should President Obama win a second term, Congress is likely to be even more hostile than in his first term, as in the Clinton years. And as in the Clinton years, that will probably mean four more years of inaction and increased resort to cant.

### Impact

#### Bad infrastructure leads to terrorist attacks- fragile systems make attacks worth pursuing

US Newswire 10 ("Coalition Urges Congress and Obama Administration to Create National Infrastructure Bank" 1/20 <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/coalition-urges-congress-and-obama-administration-to-create-national-infrastructure-bank-82167467.html>)AK

"There is also a national security benefit to be derived from reversing the corrosive condition of U.S. critical infrastructure," said Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D., President, Center for National Policy. "Acts of terrorism will have substantial political and military value for our adversaries as long as these operations promise to generate large costs or produce political changes that advance their interests. It follows that the more fragile U.S. vital systems are, the more likely it is that terrorists will assume they can cause the kind of fallout that makes these attacks worth pursuing."

### Heg

#### --Defense cuts are inevitable – kills hegemony

**Mandelbaum, 8-9** [Michael, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, “America’s Coming Retrenchment”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68024/michael-mandelbaum/americas-coming-retrenchment?page=show>, CMR]

The acrimonious **negotiation that produced legislation to raise the** American **debt ceiling while cutting the federal budget deficit**, which President Barack Obama signed on August 2, **was a**n early **skirmish** in the battle to bring deficits under control. **That battle is bound to be protracted, difficult, and contentious, and one of its casualties will be spending on foreign and security policy, which will decline in the years ahead**. **That will impose new limits on the projection of American power around the world.** What a difference a year makes. Only last year, in the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, I published a review (“Overpowered?”) of three books whose common theme was that the United States was doing far too much beyond its borders. For its own sake and the sake of other countries, the three authors recommended, the country should pursue a more modest foreign policy. Now, as I forecast at the end of that essay, the fiscal condition of the United States will compel the fulfillment of that recommendation -- for better (the general sentiment of the books’ authors) or for worse (my own view). The August 2 legislation calls for $1 trillion in spending cuts over a ten-year period, about $350 billion of which is likely to come from the defense budget. The legislation also mandates a further $1.5 trillion reduction in expenditures in the next decade. If a special Congressional panel cannot agree on the targets of those reductions, an automatic trigger will impose across-the-board budget savings that will lower the Defense Department’s budget by an estimated $600 billion. Even if the triggering mechanism is avoided, **spending on defense and** on other aspects of U.S. **foreign policy will decline over the next decade**. The scale of deficit reduction required to put the country on solid fiscal footing is so large that it must involve both limits on Social Security and Medicare, despite the Democrats’ determination to preserve these programs intact, and increases in taxes in some form, despite the Republicans’ determination to prevent this. **When Americans are paying more to their government and getting less from it, they will not be as generous in supporting the U**nited **S**tates’ **global role as they have been in recent decades. Defense budgets will contract** for two other reasons. First, **the sense of external threat that the country felt throughout the Cold War and after 9/11 has ebbed.** **Americans’ support for defense spending depends on how threatened they feel**. **For the moment**, at least, **the world does not seem particularly threatening.** Second, **the politics of the federal budget do not favor the D**epartment **o**f **D**efense, **which cannot count on either political party to protect its share of federal spending**. No major part of the Democratic coalition makes foreign and security policy a high priority. The Republican coalition does include national security hawks, who are committed to a large military and a robust foreign policy. But there are two other parts of the Republican coalition. Social conservatives are indifferent in these matters, and **proponents of small government and low taxes -- now the most influential** members of the coalition because they express the views of the Tea Party movement -- **are willing to sacrifice defense spending** for the sake of their principal goals. So **the U**nited **S**tates **will be able to afford to do less in the world in the future than it has in the past**. Which parts of U.S. foreign policy will be -- and which should be -- discontinued? As I argue in my 2010 book, The Frugal Superpower, the feature of twenty-first-century foreign policy likeliest to be eliminated, and the one with which the country can most easily do without, is the type of military intervention that the United States has conducted in the first two post–Cold War decades in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Different as these operations have been, they have all saddled the United States with the unwanted, protracted, expensive, and frustrating task of nation-building -- that is, restoring the institutions of government where they had collapsed or building them where they never existed. The policy of nation-building has three drawbacks.

#### --Decline is seriously inevitable – the aff can’t overcome it – military overstretch, economy

**Schweller ’10** – professor of political science at Ohio State University

[Randall L, “Ennui Becomes Us”, The National Interest, Jan-Feb, lexis]

THE PRIMARY cause of these tectonic shifts is American decline. Hegemonic decline is inevitable **because unchecked power tends to overextend itself and succumb to the vice of imperial overstretch**; because the hegemon overpays for international public goods, such as security, while its **free-riding competitors underpay** for them; and because its once-hungry society becomes soft and decadent, engaging in self-destructive hedonism and overconsumption. In recent years, the America-in-decline debate of the 1980s and early 1990s has reemerged with a vengeance. Despite the fact that the United States is the lone superpower with unrivaled command of air, sea and space, **there is a** growing chorus **of observers proclaiming the** end of American primacy. Joining the ranks of these "declinists," Robert Pape forcefully argued in these pages that "**America is in** unprecedented decline**," having lost** 30 percent **of its relative economic power since 2000**.5 To be sure, the macrostatistical picture of the United States is a bleak one. **Its savings rate is zero**; **its currency is sliding to new depths; it runs huge current-account, trade and budget deficits; its medium income is flat; its entitlement commitments are unsustainable; and its once-unrivaled capital markets are now struggling to compete** with Hong Kong and London. **The staggering costs of** the wars in **Afghanistan and Iraq, combined with the financial bailout and stimulus packages** doled out in response to the subprime-mortgage and financial-credit crises, **have battered the U.S. economy,** opening the door for **peer** competitors **to make** **substantial** **relative gains**. The current bear market ranks among the worst in history, with the Dow and S&P down almost 50 percent from their 2007 peaks. **The major cause of our troubles**, both in the short and long term, **is debt**: the United States is borrowing massively to finance current consumption. **America continues to run** unprecedented **trade** deficits **with its only burgeoning peer competitor,** China, **which**, based on current trajectories, **is predicted to surpass the U**nited **S**tates **as the world's leading economic power** by 2040. As of July 2009, Washington owed Beijing over $800 billion, meaning that every person in the "rich" United States has, in effect, borrowed about $3,000 from someone in the "poor" People's Republic of China over the past decade.6 But **this devolution of America's status is** truly inevitable **because of the forces of entropy.** No action by U.S. leaders can prove a viable counterweight.

### Transitions

**No transition wars—Haas says that no rising power has the will or ability to violently overturn the system—they would rather integrate peacefully into it—China and Russia face structural problems that prevent aggression—even if wars did occur, they wouldn’t escalate**

Richard **Haas** (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 200**8** “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask\_the\_expert.html

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is **remote** and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

### Lashout

No, we won’t- intuitive assertions shouldn’t cut it- best studies of IR prove the US can and will successfully retrench- all their transition args are wrong

**MacDonald and Parent 11—Profs of Political Science @ Williams and Miami**

Paul K. and Joseph M., Graceful Decline?, International Security, Spring 2k11, Volume 35, Number 4, Muse

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. 12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes

. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.